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The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is based on the assumption that a decision maker is
equally motivated to seek reward and avoid punishment, and that decision making is
governed solely by the intertemporal attribute (i.e., preference for an option that produces
an immediate outcome instead of one that yields a delayed outcome is believed to
reflect risky decision making and is considered a deficit). It was assumed in the present
study that the emotion- and cognition-based processing dichotomy manifests in the IGT
as reward and punishment frequency and the intertemporal attribute. It was further
proposed that the delineation of emotion- and cognition-based processing is contingent
upon reward and punishment as manifested in the frame of the task (variant type) and
task motivation (instruction type). The effects of IGT variant type (reward vs. punishment)
and instruction type (task motivation induced by instruction types: reward, punishment,
reward and punishment, or no hint) on the intertemporal and frequency attributes of
IGT decision-making were analyzed. Decision making in the reward variant was equally
governed by both attributes, and significantly affected by instruction type, while decision
making in the punishment variant was differentially affected by the two attributes and
not significantly impacted by instruction type. These results suggest that reward and
punishment manifested via task frame as well as the task motivation may facilitate the
differentiation of emotion- and cognition-based processing in the IGT.
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INTRODUCTION
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) is widely
used to examine the interaction of emotion and cognition in
foresighted decision making under conditions of risk and uncer-
tainty. The task tests long-term decision making, and it is believed
that inputs from emotion-based processing are beneficial rather
than an impediment to long-term decision making (otherwise
is believed to be a purely cognition-based process). The IGT
offers a choice among four decks of cards, each labeled A′, B′,
C′, and D′. The four decks differ in two ways: (a) the net out-
come across time (i.e., intertemporal attribute), whereby decks A′
and B′ are poor long-term choices and decks C′ and D′ are safe
long-term choices; and (b) the frequency of immediate reward
and punishment irrespective of net or long-term outcomes (i.e.,
frequency attribute), whereby decks A′ and C′ could be perceived
as poor choices due to frequent punishments/infrequent rewards
and decks B′ and D′ could be perceived as safe choices due to
infrequent punishments/frequent rewards.
Task performance was originally believed to depend entirely
on the intertemporal attribute (i.e., the choice of immediate out-
comes over delayed outcomes is considered disadvantageous),
and to disregard frequency of reward and punishment. The
reward and punishment schedule of the IGT was assumed to be
cognitively impenetrable (i.e., neither the frequency nor the long
term payoff/outcome were believed to be cognitively processed),
which implied the following: (1) that reward and punishment
are indistinguishable from each other and weigh equally, and
(2) that decision making is solely driven by the intertemporal-
ity of the task choices (i.e., irrespective of reward/punishment,
the choice of delayed outcomes over immediate outcomes is con-
sidered advantageous). To rule out the sensitivity to reward and
punishment as an alternate explanation for myopic decision mak-
ing in the IGT, Bechara et al. (2000a,b) tested the first implication
by comparing intertemporal decision making in two types of
IGT variants: the original reward variant (A′B′C′D′) that has
“rewards” as a prominent outcome and a punishment variant
(E′F′G′H′) that has “loss/punishment” (see Appendix B for vari-
ant details) as a prominent outcome. It was demonstrated that
decisionmaking was governed by the intertemporal attribute irre-
spective of the frame or type of IGT variant; in other words,
the reward and punishment frame of the IGT variant did not
affect intertemporal decision making. However, one study (Maia
and McClelland, 2004) of the IGT reward variant showed that
participants exhibited knowledge of the reward and punishment
schedules (specifically of long term outcome), which indicates
these schedules are cognitively penetrable in the IGT reward vari-
ant. Moreover, in another study of the IGT reward variant, the
frequency of reward and punishment, rather than intertemporal-
ity, was found to control decision making (Lin et al., 2007). This
evidence negates the assertion that intertemporality is the sole
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factor governing decision making in the IGT reward variant, and
supports a role of reward and punishment in IGT decision mak-
ing. This influence of reward and punishment on IGT decision
making, however, is still largely unclear.
It is assumed in this paper that IGT decisions are based on
both frequency of reward and punishment, and intertemporality,
and that these two attributes reflect emotion- and cognition-
based processing, respectively. It is contended that the role of
reward-punishment in the form of IGT variant type and task
motivation toward reward and punishment is to differentiate
emotion-cognition processing in the IGT. Decision making based
on the intertemporal attribute might require the recollection
of previous outcomes to determine which decks produced net
gains over the trial periods, and therefore might require cognitive
resources and involve working memory. On the other hand, deci-
sion making based on the frequency attribute imposes no such
demand on cognitive resources. Therefore, decisionmaking based
on the intertemporal attribute might require cognitive activity,
whereas decision making based on the frequency attribute may
reflect activity in the emotion-based system. Indeed, Stocco et al.
(2009) found a double dissociation in decision making based on
both attributes suggesting that intertemporal decision making
demands cognitive resources and that the two attributes reflect
emotion-cognition dichotomy.
Others have observed that intertemporal decision-making
reflects explicit learning (Maia and McClelland, 2004); is depen-
dent on hippocampus-mediated memory systems, such as the
declarative memory system (Gupta et al., 2009); and engages
working memory (Hinson et al., 2002). Conversely, decision
making based on the frequency attribute may reflect auto-
matic processing (Wilder et al., 1998; Stocco et al., 2009),
which is indicative of emotion-based processing. Support for
this dichotomy comes from dual-process theory of reasoning,
which suggests the existence of two systems that process infor-
mation differently. One system is automatic, emotion-based, and
concerned with the present, whereas the second is reflective,
cognition-based, and concerned with the future (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1971). Therefore, it was assumed in the present study
that IGT decision making based on the frequency of reward and
punishment reflects automatic emotion-based processing, and
decision making based on intertemporality reflects cognitive pro-
cessing: thus, the two attributes, respectively, reflect emotion- and
cognition-based processing. However, it is not yet known which
factor determines the dichotomization of emotion-cognition-
based processing in the IGT.
In the present study, it is proposed that the frame of the IGT
variant and the task motivation toward reward and punishment
might influence the differentiation of emotion-cognition-based
processing. Contrary to the assumption that intertemporal deci-
sion making is not influenced by the frames of the IGT variant
(Bechara et al., 2000a), it has been observed that intertemporal
decision making is more strengthened in the punishment variant
than in the reward variant (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000b, 2002; Must
et al., 2006, 2007; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2006). In one such study,
it was observed that the punishment variant, which produces a
“loss” outcome for every choice (whereas the reward variant pro-
duces a “gain” outcome for every choice), was more conducive
to the intertemporal attribute [i.e., cognition-based processing;
(Singh and Khan, 2012)]. It was suggested that because the pun-
ishment/loss variant triggers risk-seeking while the “reward” vari-
ant induces risk-aversion, the punishment variant might require
greater cognitive processing than the reward variant. Greater
activity in the cognition-based system suggests greater differentia-
tion of emotion-cognition processing in the punishment variant.
Therefore, it was expected that the IGT variant type would affect
the dichotomization of emotion-cognition-based processing in
IGT decision making.
Similar to the assumption that the frame of the IGT variant
does not affect intertemporal decision making (Bechara et al.,
2000a), the task instructions are also based on an assumption
that IGT decision making has equal reward- and punishment-
related motivation; the instructions are bidirectional in nature,
prompting the decisionmaker to seek reward as well as avoid pun-
ishment. However, contrary to the assumed bi-directionality of
task motivation, it has been observed that intertemporal decision
making in the IGT is dependent on avoiding punishment rather
than seeking reward. For instance, Fernie and Tunney (2006)
found that a portion of the instructions that advised the avoid-
ance of “bad” cards was necessary for intertemporal decision
making in the reward variant because omission of that portion
resulted in poor intertemporal decisionmaking. The omitted part
was as follows: “All I can say is that some decks are worse than
others. You may find all of them bad, but some are worse than
others are. No matter how much you find yourself losing, you
can still win if you stay away from the worst decks.” Similarly,
Balodis et al. (2006) simplified the instructions by excluding
a part that advised subjects to avoid “bad” cards. The simpli-
fied instructions were as follows: “In this card game there are
four decks of cards. You can draw cards from any of the decks.
Every time you click on [sic] card, you will win some play-
money. With some card draws you will lose money as well. The
object of the game is to win as much play-money as possible,
or avoid losing as little of the money as possible. You will begin
the game with $2000.” These simplified instructions resulted in
poor intertemporal decision making, but the reinstatement of
the warning resulted in improvement (Balodis et al., 2006). In
a previous study, by the present author, it was observed that
intertemporal decision making in the IGT reward variant is dif-
ferentially affected by task motivation toward reward and task
motivation toward punishment because a unidirectional version
of the standard bidirectional instructions enhanced intertem-
poral decision making (Singh and Khan, 2012). It has been
suggested that the unidirectional instructions (i.e., only to seek
reward or to avoid punishment) are less taxing on working mem-
ory; this results in more efficient cognition-based processing,
and consequently increases intertemporal decisionmaking (Singh
and Khan, 2012). According to dual-process theories, efficient
cognition-based processing inhibits emotion-based processing
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Evans, 2003), and this inhibi-
tion may result in more differentiated emotion-cognition based
processing. Therefore, in addition to variant type (reward and
punishment variant), it was expected that task motivation toward
reward and punishment might also affect the differentiation of
emotion-cognition processing in the IGT.
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Thus, in the present study, it is explored whether varying the
reward and punishment frame via variant and/or instruction type
affects the emotion-cognition dichotomy, as tested via the two
attributes in IGT decision making. It was hypothesized that IGT
variant type and task instruction type would influence which
attribute governed IGT decision-making.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SAMPLE
Three hundred and twenty healthy undergraduate and gradu-
ate students volunteered for the study (mean age = 23.82 years;
SD = 3.25; male = 160). All participants had more than 18 years
of education. Most of the participants were right-handed (86.1%)
and non-smokers (93.6%).
DESIGN
This study used a 2 (reward variant: intertemporal and fre-
quency attributes) × 2 (punishment variant: intertemporal and
frequency attributes) × 4 (instruction type: avoid punishment,
seek reward, standard, and no hint) design. The two net scores
obtained via the two attributes (attribute type) in the two variants
(variant type) were the within-subjects variables, and instruction
type was the between-subjects variable. The order of variant type
presentation was counter-balanced and the sample was gender-
balanced; neither presentation order nor gender affected the
results (p > 0.5).
IGT decisionmaking was analyzed according to the “net score”
method (Bechara et al., 1994), in which one total net score was
calculated for the five blocks. It is customary to analyze IGT
performance using five block-wise net scores rather than one
total net score of the five blocks because this method allows for
the comparison of participants’ learning rate across blocks of
trials. However, the focus of the present research at this stage
was to differentiate intertemporal decision making (believed to
reflect cognition-based processing) from the frequency attribute
(believed to reflect emotion-based processing) and to test if the
variant type and instruction type affected the differentiation of
the two attributes.
To calculate an index of the intertemporal attribute in the
reward variant, the number of cards drawn from decks A′ and
B′ were added, and their sum was subtracted from the number
of cards drawn from decks C′ and D′ ([decks C′+ D′]—[decks
A′+ B′]). This was done for a block of 20 trials each, and scores
for the five blocks were added to obtain a total net score for the
reward variant. The formula used to calculate the intertemporal
attribute index in the punishment variant was [“E” + “G”]—
[“F”+ “H”]. The formula used to calculate the frequency attribute
for the reward variant was ([decks “B” + “D”]—[decks “A” +
“C”]); for the punishment variant, it was [“F” + “G”]—[“E” +
“H”].
MATERIALS
The computerized IGT progressive reward (A′, B′, C′, D′) and
progressive punishment (E′, F′, G′, H′) variants were used. The
progressive variant is slightly different from the original IGT
in that it exaggerates the future outcome; that is, it increases
the magnitude of long-term rewards in the advantageous decks
and long-term punishments in the risky decks (Bechara et al.,
2000a). Four sets of IGT instructions were used: (1) instruc-
tions that prompted the decision maker to seek reward (Reward),
(2) instructions that prompted the decision maker to avoid
punishment (Punishment), (3) the routinely used bidirectional
instructions that prompt the decision maker to seek reward and
avoid punishment (Standard), and (4) instructions that contained
no prompts toward either reward or punishment (No hint; see
Appendix A).
PROCEDURE
Demographic information was first obtained via questionnaire
from each participant. Participants were told that they would
be taking part in a decision making experiment where they
would be playing/gambling with play-points after which they
gave their informed consent. The study was approved by a the-
sis committee (Research Progress Committee), a departmental
committee, and an institute-level committee in charge of over-
seeing the postgraduate research program. Participants were
tested individually in a laboratory and were assigned to one
of the experimental conditions. Two IGT variants were pre-
sented in a counter-balanced design (i.e., reward variant fol-
lowed by punishment variant, or vice versa) with one of the
four types of instructions (Reward, Punishment, Standard, and
No hint). Thus, each participant performed both IGT variants
under one type of instruction. Instructions were read before the
first variant was presented. After finishing the first variant, a
small break was given (5min). Following this, the same instruc-
tions were read for the second variant, and the second variant
was presented. When participants had completed both variants,
they were debriefed and thanked for their participation in the
study.
DATA ANALYSIS
Data were analyzed using Statistical Product for Service Solutions
version 16 (Chicago, IL, USA). The threshold for statistical signif-
icance was set to p < 0.05.
RESULTS
Mean decision making net scores based the two attributes
(intertemporal and frequency) in the two variants (reward and
punishment) across the four types of instructions (reward, pun-
ishment, standard, and no-hint) are presented in Table 1.
The results of a repeated-measures analysis of variance using
the four net scores (obtained on the basis of the two attributes
in the two variants) showed a non-significant main effect of
attribute type and a significant interaction of instruction and
attribute type for the reward variant [F(3, 312) = 4.52, η2p =
0.04, p < 0.01] (see Figure 1). Multiple comparisons for the
reward variant using Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference
test showed that only the unidirectional instructions for seek-
ing reward differed from the standard and no hint instructions;
however, the significance levels of these variables were p = 0.08
and p = 0.09, respectively, indicating marginal significance. A
significant main effect of attribute type [F(1, 312) = 9.36, ηp2 =
0.03, p < 0.01], but no interaction effect of instruction and
attribute type, was observed for the punishment variant (see
Figure 2).
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Table 1 | Descriptive statistics for instruction type, variant type, and attribute type (n = 320).
Variant type Attribute type Instruction type
Reward Punishment Standard No-hint
Reward Intertemporal 2.92 (30.78) 10.34 (26.60) −2.58 (23.88) −2.78 (22.12)
Frequency 13.52 (22.07) 16.65 (20.53) 15.80 (26.76) 10.22 (19.20)
Punishment Intertemporal 19.05 (36.16) 7.65 (30.03) 4.68 (33.92) 9.50 (21.66)
Frequency 10.18 (29.37) 6.05 (29.47) 7.23 (29.14) 8.65 (29.18)
Values shown are means and standard deviations (in parentheses).
FIGURE 1 | The effects of four types of instructions on decision making
in the reward variant, assessed via two attributes: intertemporal (C′+
D′)—(A′+ B′) and frequency (B′+ D′)—(A′+ C′). Error bars represent
standard errors.
FIGURE 2 | The effects of four types of instructions on decision making
in the punishment variant, assessed via two attributes: intertemporal
(E′+ G′)—(F′+ H′) and frequency (F′+ G′)—(E′+ H′). Error bars represent
standard errors.
DISCUSSION
The study examined the effects of task motivation and IGT
variant framing on the two attributes of decision making in
the IGT. The results indicated that decision-making was gov-
erned equally by both attributes, and that task instructions
affected attribute type in the reward variant. In the punish-
ment variant, decision-making was differentially governed by
the two attributes, and the task instructions did not affect the
attributes.
These results are consistent with previous studies that showed
that decision making in the reward variant is not solely based on
the intertemporal attribute (e.g., Chiu and Lin, 2007; Lin et al.,
2007; Chiu et al., 2008), which suggests the influence of more
than one attribute on decision making in the reward variant.
The present results showed an interaction between task instruc-
tions and attribute type in the reward variant, which is con-
sistent with the observation that task instructions—specifically
those that advise subjects to avoid “bad” cards—are critical for
intertemporal decision making in the reward variant (e.g., Blair
and Cipolotti, 2000; Balodis et al., 2006; Fernie and Tunney,
2006). The results suggest that the bifurcation of task moti-
vation toward reward and punishment might be differentially
conducive to the two attributes (i.e., it facilitates cognitive or emo-
tional processing), and that it might facilitate dichotomization of
the emotion-cognition processing when the IGT is framed in a
reward variant.
The differential governing of decision making by the two
attributes in the punishment variant suggests a dominance of
one attribute. This observation is consistent with previous claims
that intertemporal decisionmaking dominates in the punishment
variant (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000b, 2002; Must et al., 2006, 2007;
Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2006). Therefore, the punishment variant
may be more effective than the reward variant at differentiating
between emotion- and cognition-based decision making. When
the two attributes are well-differentiated, task instructions do not
seem to play a critical role. The results further corroborate the
assertion that instruction-induced taskmotivation toward reward
and punishment plays a role in the dichotomization of emotion-
cognition processing. Results additionally show that task moti-
vation differentially affects decision making in the reward and
punishment variants of the IGT. Instructions play an important
role in the reward variant, where there is equivocal attribute pref-
erence (i.e., undifferentiated emotion-cognition based process-
ing), but not in the punishment variant, where there is unequal
attribute preference (i.e., differentiated emotion-cognition based
processing).
Furthermore, the present results support the earlier observa-
tion that bifurcating task instructions into reward-seeking and
punishment-avoidance might reduce working memory demands
(Singh and Khan, 2012), resulting in more efficient cognition-
based processing and inhibition of emotion-based processing
(i.e., facilitation of the differentiation between the two attributes),
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in other words, a well-differentiated emotion-cognition based
processing. This explanation (about the role of working
memory in improving cognition-based processing via a well-
differentiation of emotion-cognition based processing) is consis-
tent with earlier findings that intertemporal decision making in
the IGT is dependent on working memory. For instance, studies
have reported that performing a secondary task interfered with
working memory and negatively affected intertemporal decision
making in the IGT reward variant (Turnbull et al., 2005; Stocco
et al., 2009). This implies that one of the ways to rectify intertem-
poral decision-making impairments, which are synonymous with
decision making deficits in a clinical sample (e.g., substance
abuse), might be to try and dissociate reward-seeking motivation
from punishment-avoidance motivation through the utilization
of unidirectional instructions. Impaired intertemporal decision
making is believed to be due to a failure to integrate both emotion
and cognition-based processing (e.g., Killgore et al., 2007). An
interesting but preliminary theoretical implication of the present
results in this regard, which requires further investigation, is
the possibility that dissociating rather than integrating emotion-
cognition processingmight result in better intertemporal decision
making in the IGT.
Future studies that examine why the punishment frame of
the IGT engages cognition-based processing and consequently
facilitates the differentiation of emotion- and cognition-based
processing to a greater degree than does the reward frame would
be informative. The speculation that the reward and punish-
ment frames of the IGT differentially rely on emotion- and
cognition-based processing is consistent with the results of at
least one study. In this experiment, the Task of Cups in a reward
and punishment frame was used to analyze decision making
in patients with a lesion in the amygdala, a brain region that
mediates emotional responsivity (Weller et al., 2007). It was
observed that participant’s decision making was impaired in the
reward frame and intact in the punishment frame, suggesting
that decision making in the punishment frame might not rely
as much on emotion-based processing as does decision mak-
ing in the reward frame. This supports the present assertion
that the loss frame in the IGT might engage cognition-based
processing to a greater extent than the reward frame, thus result-
ing in a more pronounced dichotomy of emotion-cognition
based processing in the loss frame compared with the reward
frame.
One limitation of the present study is the lack of account-
ing for differences in personality (Franken and Muris, 2005)
and mood (Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007), which may have affected
IGT decision-making. The absence of a real-money reward or a
material incentive for participation might be another limitation;
however, at least one study has shown that there is no difference in
IGT decision making based on whether incentives are real (mon-
etary) or facsimiles (Bowman and Turnbull, 2003). Nevertheless,
these limitations should be taken into account when interpret-
ing the findings of this study. The findings of the present study
suggest that reward and punishment manipulated via IGT task
frame and task motivation play a critical role in IGT decision
making, and that role might include the delineation of emotion-
and cognition-based processing.
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APPENDIX A
Four types of instructions were used in the study: standard (1a
and 1b), seek reward (2), avoid punishment (3), and no hint (4a
and 4b) instructions.
(1a) Standard instructions, reward variant: “In front of you on
the screen, there are four decks of cards: A′, B′, C′, and D′.
When we begin the game, I want you to select one card at
a time by clicking on a card from any deck. Each time you
select a card, the computer will tell you that you won some
money. I don’t know how much money you will win. You
will find this out as you go along. Every time you win, the
green bar at the top of the screen gets bigger. Every so often,
when you click on a card, the computer will tell you that you
won some money as usual, but it will also say that you lost
some money as well. I don’t know when you will lose or by
how much. You will find out as you go along. Every time
you lose, the green bar at the top of the screen gets smaller.
You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to another
at any time, and as often as you wish. The goal of the game
is to win as much money as possible and to avoid losing as
much money as possible. You won’t know when the game
will end. Simply keep on playing until the computer stops.
You will have $2000 of credit, shown by the green bar, at the
start of the game. The only hint I can give you, which is the
most important thing to note, is this: Out of these four decks
of cards, some are worse than others. To win, you should
try to stay away from bad decks. No matter how much you
find yourself losing, you can still win the game if you avoid
the bad decks. Moreover, the computer does not change the
position of the decks once the game begins. It does not make
you lose at random, or make you lose money based on the
last card you picked.”
(1b) Standard instructions, punishment variant: “In front of you
on the screen, there are four decks of cards: E′, F′, G′, and
H′. When we begin the game, I want you to select one card
at a time by clicking on a card from any deck. Each time you
select a card, the computer will tell you that you lost some
money. I don’t know how much money you will lose. You
will find this out as you go along. Every time you lose, the
green bar at the top of the screen gets smaller. Every so often,
when you click on a card, the computer will tell you that you
lost some money as usual, but it will say that you gained
some money as well. I don’t know when you will gain or by
howmuch. You will find out as you go along. Every time you
gain some money, the green bar at the top of the screen gets
bigger. You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to the
other at any time, and as often as you wish. The goal of the
game is to avoid losing as much money as possible and to
win as much money as possible. You won’t know when the
game will end. Simply keep on playing until the computer
stops. You will have $2000 of credit, shown by the green bar,
at the start of the game. The only hint I can give you, which
is the most important thing to note, is this: Out of these
four decks of cards, some are better than others. To win, you
should try to choose from the good decks. No matter how
much you find yourself losing, you can still win the game if
you choose from the good decks. Moreover, the computer
does not change the position of the decks once the game
begins. It does not make you win or lose at random, or make
you win or lose money based on the last card you picked.”
(2) Seek reward instructions: Same as in the standard instruc-
tions, reward variant, except that the bold text is now “The
goal of the game is to win as much money as possible.”
(3) Avoid punishment instructions: Same as in the standard
instructions, punishment variant, except that the bold text
is now “The goal of the game is to avoid losing as much
money as possible.”
(4a) No hint instructions, reward variant: “In front of you on the
screen, there are four decks of cards: A′, B′, C′, andD′.When
we begin the game, I want you to select one card at a time by
clicking on a card from any of these decks. Sometimes you
will win points, and sometimes you will lose points. You are
absolutely free to switch from one deck to another at any
time, and as often as you wish. You won’t know when the
game will end. Simply keep on playing until the computer
stops. You will have $2000 of credit, shown by the green bar,
at the start of the game. Moreover, the computer does not
change the position of the decks once the game begins. It
does not make you lose at random, or make you lose money
based on the last card you picked.”
(4b) No hint instructions, punishment variant: “In front of you
on the screen, there are four decks of cards: E′, F′, G′, and
H′. When we begin the game, I want you to select one card
at a time by clicking on a card from any of these decks.
Sometimes you will win points and sometimes you will lose
points. You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to
the other at any time, and as often as you wish. You won’t
know when the game will end. Simply keep on playing until
the computer stops. You will have $2000 of credit, shown by
the green bar, at the start of the game. Moreover, the com-
puter does not change the position of the decks once the
game begins. It does not make you lose at random, or make
you lose money based on the last card you picked.”
FIGURE A1 | The effects of four types of instructions on decision
making in the reward variant were assessed via two attributes:
intertemporal (C′+ D′)—(A′+ B′) and frequency (B′+ D′)—(A′+ C′); and
the punishment variant was assessed via two attributes: intertemporal
(E′+ G′)—(F′+ H′) and frequency (F′+ G′)—(E′+ H′). Error bars represent
standard errors.
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APPENDIX B
1. Deck information in the two IGT variants: The IGT reward
variant offers a choice among four decks of cards labeled A′,
B′, C′, and D′. Unlike the original paper-and-pencil based
task (ABCD), the computerized task (A′B′C′D′) has increased
delayed punishment and therefore amplifies the effect of dis-
advantageous choices (see Bechara et al., 2000a, for differ-
ences between the original and the computerized version).
Unbeknownst to the decision maker, decks A′ and B′ have
high immediate rewards (100 points per card-pick) but 50%
of cards drawn from deck A′ giving a loss of 35–100 points
and 10% of cards drawn from deck B’ giving a loss of 250
points, such that 10 cards drawn from decks A′ and B′ result in
a net loss of 250 points. Decks C′ and D′ have small immedi-
ate rewards (50 points per card-pick) with 50% of cards drawn
from deck C′ giving a loss of 25–75 points and 10% of cards
drawn from deck D’ giving a loss of 250 points, such that 10
cards drawn from decks C′ and D′ result in a net gain of
250 points. The punishment variant offers a choice between
four decks of cards labeled E′, F′, G′, and H′. After a card is
picked, the “loss” is announced, which at times is followed by
a “gain.” Decks F’ and H′ give immediate low losses and a low
net gain, while decks E′ and G′ give immediate high losses and
a high net gain. Long-term advantageous decision making is
reflected in choosing high-immediate-loss decks (decks E′ and
G′) and avoiding low-immediate-punishment decks. Although
both variants offer both rewards and punishments, the promi-
nent outcome in the reward variant is a “win,” while that in the
punishment variant is a “loss,” which underlies the assertion
that a positive frame (i.e., “gain”) is triggered in the reward
variant and a negative frame (i.e., “loss”) is triggered in the
punishment variant.
2. The graph shows the effects of variant, instruction, and
attribute type in IGT decision-making (Figure A1).
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